9. The ‘HELP’ rocks problem supports that there can be more than just physical properties of things in the world. The ‘HELP’ rocks problem raises the issue of intentionality. The first scenario suggests that someone who is stranded on an island, places rocks to form the word HELP to seek rescue. Another scenario is where natural causes also formed rocks that spelt out ‘HELP’. They are physically identical, however are they still the same thing? I think the first one obviously has a meaning and purpose, where as the second one is completely random and irrelevant. Although there is no way to differentiate between them, I don’t feel like there are still the same thing. The intention behind how the rocks were formed is crucial, you can’t simply look at the end result.
10. Interactionism is when mind and matter interact to cause events in the body, whilst still being independent from each other.
11. Parallelism in the context of dualism, is that there can be relations within the mental and within the physical, but not between the two. Just like a parallel line that never touches or intersects.
12. The casual Exclusion Principle (C.E.P) is when there can be causal relations only between members of the same ontological category.
13. One approach used to explain parallelism is stating that it is all simply a coincidence. This is where physical and mental relations coincidentally interact with each other. However this seems unlikely and very counter-intuitive. The other explanation is to have a third party (God) that arranges the harmonies by setting up mental and physical synchronizing things at the beginning. But having a third party contradicts the Causal Exclusion Principle which had to be accepted earlier.
14. Epiphenomenalism is the view that your mental thoughts are a by-product of your physical actions but that they don’t influence your actions. This view does not solve the problem produced by the causal exclusion principle because no non-physical relations can occur within this principle.
15. The most significant objection to Epiphenomenalism will have to be the third one listed that suggests Epiphenomenalism is self-refuting. This is simply because Epiphenomenalism is essentially the idea that all beliefs are caused by brain states and not other non-physical beliefs… This is a major contradiction, seeing as Epiphenomenalism is a belief it self.
16. The story of limps reveals to us that not all referential statements refer to physical properties. For example, when you say “I have a computer” this is something you can pick up where as “I have a limp” refers to a behaviour or experience.
17. Having a ‘limp’ might be similar to having a ‘mind’ because they are both experiences that can’t be reduced or explained with only physical properties.
18. A behaviourist might explain someone experiencing a toothache by the way you behave and react from different pains that contribute to you having a tooth ache.
19. The ‘I-just-know-I-am-referring-to-an-inner-state’ objection sounds plausible except language cannot function without publicly shared critea of application. As in the word ‘pain’ represents the pain-behaviour but the actual feeling of pain is in-accessible to other people.
20. Identity theory states that the mind is the brain. It is called identity theory because you identify the mind with the brain.
21. I think it is more reasonable to believe that events in the mind and brain-states are correlated. I don’t believe they are the same thing. They interact with each other but they are not identical, just like how thunder and lightning are correlated.
22. Materialists Identity Theorists don’t deny that there are mental states they are just stating what they are.
23. A Functionalist characterises the mind by the range of things or functions it does (thinks, believes, hopes etc.) not by what its physically made of. For example, a calculator can do and solve certain things not because its made of plastic and silicon ships.
24. A functionalist wouldn’t have any limits on what the mind could be composed of. If the mind can perform the functions than what it is made of shouldn’t matter.
25. I don’t think one could organise the entire population of China into a mind because in doing so, it simply is people communicating and organising together, it doesn’t mean they share the same thoughts etc. Another example of this sort of ‘mind’ in nature are how ants live. An ant exists individually and cannot accomplish much on their own however a colony of ants can create and act like one being.
26. The behaviour of a Sphex Wasp shows very low intelligence. At first glance, the wasp appears to be intelligent by checking if all is well in order to secure her eggs, however, a human interference makes the wasp repeat itself until the human is bored. It acts automatically like a machine. The wasp still shows levels of intelligence by having a routine or procedure. Although it cannot acknowledge certain things and adapt to change, they still have intelligence.
27. The Turing Test explores the possibility of having a computer with a mind. It raises the question: Can machines think? The Turing test is where a computer tries to convince a human that he or she is a human as well by behaving and responding like one. I don’t think using the Turing Test is a good way to decide whether someone has a human mind because a human mind exercises many complex abilities which cannot be tested in one simple test.
28. Searle’s ‘Chinese Room Argument’ defeats the Turing Tests claim for the possibility of artificial intelligence because even though the translator may be able to spell out characters it doesn’t understand Chinese characters, therefore it doesn’t understand the conversation (and intention of it.) Similarly, a computer can create the appearance of a conversation but it does not understand what its saying, showing no intelligence.
Philosophy 